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Executive Summary: 
	  
The hydraulic fracking boom of the last two decades has led to a dramatic increase in the 
number of wells drilled across the United States as well as a drastic increase in the number of 
operators working in the industry.  Within these new companies entering the industry, there is 
substantial diversity among operator type and size.  While there are still a few large players in 
the industry, the fracking boom has rapidly expanded the number of small and independent 
operators.  While a benefit for small entrepreneurship in the United States, there is some question 
within the industry as to whether or not small oil and gas operators are as safe as large operators.  
This study explored this idea and tested a general industry assumption that smaller firms are 
more likely to commit or be assessed regulatory (administrative and environmental) violations at 
the state level. 
 To test whether or not small oil and gas operators are more or less likely to commit 
violations at the well site than larger companies, a data analysis of oil and gas inspection and 
violation data was conducted in two states that have been active in the unconventional oil and 
gas industry over the last 2 decades.  The two states selected for this study were Pennsylvania 
and Colorado.  Violation and inspection data was analyzed from 2005 to 2014 to see if operator 
size had an impact on the number of violations assessed/committed per inspection.  To 
accompany this analysis, informational interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders 
and industry experts in and around the oil and gas industry.  These interviews were conducted to 
gain an understanding of general industry assumptions in the oil and gas sector related to size 
and compliance and to glean information that could not be ascertained from the analyzed datasets 
alone.  These interviews were then analyzed and compared to the hard data collected from 
Pennsylvania and Colorado.   
 The results of this study concluded that there is a general industry wide assumption that 
small operators in the oil and gas industry are more likely to commit/be assessed state 
compliance violations than larger firms.  The data from Pennsylvania and Colorado appear to 
confirm this assumption.  The negative binomial regression models run in this study indicate that 
in both Pennsylvania and Colorado, smaller firms commit more violations per inspection than 
medium or large sized firms.  While some uncertainty surrounds the accuracy of the datasets 
used in the study, the results suggest that larger companies commit fewer violations than smaller 
firms.  A rationale for this conclusion may be that larger firms have better technology, more 
employees, greater redundant expertise, and more to lose than smaller firms.   
These results have broad implications for both state regulators and the wider industry. 
From a regulatory perspective, if state regulators wish to promote environmental safety at all 
costs, then they may want to increase barriers to entry or regulatory oversight of smaller firms 
knowing that small firms are more likely to commit violations than larger firms.  From an 
industry perspective, these results may indicate that larger firms should promote a more 
cooperative environment with smaller firms.  If small firms are more likely to be bad actors than 
larger firms, then it may be possible that a few small firms are hurting the image of the industry 
as a whole, and as a result the larger, more compliant companies.  By sharing information and 
helping smaller firms comply with regulations, large operators may be able to help their own 
operations by improving compliance among smaller firms. 
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Section I 
Introduction: 
	  
 The expansion and discovery of US onshore natural gas and oil reserves over the last 20 
years has dramatically altered the American energy supply outlook.  With the investment in and 
expansion of shale gas extraction technologies, vast unexplored oil and gas resources are 
beginning to be exploited across the country.  Expansion into previously unutilized shale plays is 
most heavily linked to the development of economical and efficient well enhancement and 
hydraulic fracturing techniques.  
 Hydraulic fracturing, known colloquially as fracking, uses pressurized water, chemical 
additives, and a variety of other materials such as sand to crack deep lying shale bed formations 
creating fissures that allow oil and natural gas to escape from formations and flow to the surface 
via horizontal and vertical wells.1  To access this resource, deep wells are drilled into horizontal 
shale deposits from the surface.  To increase well integrity and prevent spills and potential 
contamination, the wellbore is lined with steel and cased in cement throughout the drilling 
process.2  Once the well has reached the producing layer, the well is perforated and vast amounts 
of water and fracking fluid are pumped down the well to ‘fracture’ the formation.  The released 
oil and gas from the formation then flow back up the well and are collected at the wellhead and 
are separated from the backflow water known as ‘produced water’.3     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Appendix 1 
2 Appendix 2 
3 American Petroleum Institute. Policy Issues. Hydraulic Fracturing: Safe Oil and Natural Gas Extraction. Accessed 
February 2015. http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/hf/hydraulic-fracturing-safe-oil-natural-gas-
extraction 
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While hydraulic fracturing is not a new drilling technique4, and has in fact had been used 
over a million times prior to 20025, improvements in drilling technology and chemical additives 
have made the technique more profitable and accessible over the last 15 years.  As this 
technology has become more available, it along with elevated oil and gas prices, have helped 
drive an oil and natural gas boom across the United States.  
 In 2000, natural gas from shale accounted for only about 1% of the total natural gas 
production in the United States; however, by 2010, shale gas accounted for 23% of all natural 
gas produced in the country.6  In the years to come, that percentage is expected to rise 
dramatically as the technique becomes more commonplace in the industry.7  By 2012, 95% of all 
new oil and gas wells in the country were hydraulically fractured, accounting for more than 43% 
of total US oil production and 67% of natural gas production.8  Hydraulic fracturing is ubiquitous 
in 32 states across the country and is under consideration in a number of others.  Nearly every 
state in the country holds some form of oil and gas play9 (i.e. shale gas, tight gas, coal bed 
natural gas…etc.) and will be impacted by the process to some degree.  
 While the development of American shale gas has obvious economic benefits, as well as 
the environmental benefit of the displacement of more carbon intensive fuel sources that have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hydraulic fracturing was first used in 1947 in a well in Grant County, Kansas.  Source: “Prudent Development – 
Realizing the Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources” National Petroleum Council, 
2011. p.169. http://npc.org/ 
5 “Prudent Development – Realizing the Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources” 
National Petroleum Council, 2011. p.169. http://npc.org/ 
6 Heikkila T, Pierce J, Gallaher S, Kagan J, Crow D, Weible C. 2013. Understanding a Period of Policy Change: The 
Case of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Policy in Colorado. Review of Policy Research. 
7 Id. 
8 IHS Global Insights, “Measuring the Economic and Energy Impacts of Proposals to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing, 
2009; and Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas and Crude Oil Production,” December 2010 and July 
2011. 
9 Appendix 3-6. 
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much higher emissions rates (such as coal) in the electricity sector10, unconventional oil and gas 
development is not without risk.  Due to the complexity of the drilling and production process, 
there are a number of opportunities for the technique to produce environmental and occupational 
harm.  
 The oil and gas industry, as well as state regulators, are concerned with a variety of 
environmental challenges associated with unconventional development.  Some of these 
challenges include: water, air, and waste.  While there is no evidence to date that fracking fluid 
has or can percolate from the producing zone of a shale formation up into ground or surface 
waters from a properly drilled well11, there is evidence that surface spills and poor well 
construction can place ground and surface water supplies at risk.12,13  Fugitive methane emissions 
from the wellhead as well as emissions from drilling equipment provide air quality concerns14 
and management and disposal of produced water and drilling mud provide challenges for waste 
treatment and disposal.15  These environmental risks have led to the regulation of fracking and 
the unconventional oil and gas industry across the US and have created strong opposition against 
the practice by public interest groups and some within the environmental community.   
 The unconventional oil and gas industry is currently regulated at the state level.  At the 
moment, no comprehensive federal regulations are in place to monitor and control the fracking 
industry; however, EPA is expected to release and implement Federal Green Completion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Koch, W. US forecasts natural gas boom through 2040. USA Today. December 16, 2013. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/16/doe-forecast-natural-gas-boom/4034723/ 
11 Jackson R, Vengosh A, New tracers identify hydraulic fracturing fluids and accidental releases from oil and gas 
operations. Environmental Science and Technology. 48(21). 2014. 
12 Holzman, D. Methane Found in well water near fracking sites. Environmental health perspectives, 119(7):a289, 
2011. 
13 DiGuilio D, Wilkin T, Miller C, Oberly G. Investigation of groundwater contamination near Pavillion, Wyoming. 
Technical Report, US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Research and Development, 2011. 
14 EPA Natural Gas Extraction – Hydraulic Fracturing. http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing 
15 EPA, EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources.  
http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy/hydraulic-fracturing-water-cycle 
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requirements in 2015 for newly drilled wells, and the Bureau of Land Management has some 
authority over drilling on Federal lands in western states.16  While each state engaged in the oil 
and gas industry has established their own rules and regulations governing industry practices, the 
success of these regulations has varied.  While success has been inconsistent, the intent of each 
state’s regulatory program has not.  Every state strives to create regulations that protect 
environmental and public health while promoting economic growth.   
 When carefully crafting these regulations, policy makers have needed to make certain 
assumptions about the industry, and about those engaged in it.  These assumptions include: who 
will be operating in a play? What is an operator’s likelihood of success? And will that operator 
be able to safely and adequately operate under the intent of the state’s regulatory framework?  As 
state regulators weight the economic benefits of fracking against its potential environmental 
harm, it is important to understand how operator risk plays into the regulatory equation.17  There 
is a substantial question in the industry as to whether or not operator size has an influence on 
regulatory compliance.  Some individuals within the oil and gas industry believe that the 
environmental risk associated with fracking scales inversely with operator size, suggesting that 
large international companies are much less risky than small independent companies without a 
large national or international presence.18   
This paper examines this assumption and begins to shed light on how operator size (as 
well as other operator attributes) contribute to environmental and compliance risk.  It uses an 
analysis of well and compliance data from two states to draw an inference about operator 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 EPA’s Air Rules for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry. 2012. 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417summarywellsites.pdf  
17 Eyer J. Does Size Matter? The Effect of Firm Size on Fracking Safety. 2014. 
18 Guilbert, D. Gold, R. As Drillers Move In, Safety Goes Up. Wall Street Journal. April 2, 2013. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324582804578346741120261384	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attributes that predict the likelihood of compliance violations as well as an analysis of the 
perceptions of industry leaders and stakeholders in an attempt to uncover how prevalent these 
assumptions are.  It is important to understand the relationship between operator size and 
compliance risk because of the need for policy makers and regulators to adequately and properly 
consider operator size (as well as other attributes) when crafting regulations.  If it is the case that 
smaller companies are more likely to commit environmental violations than their larger 
counterparts, it may suggest that states need to factor this into their regulatory framework.  
However, if this assumption is unfounded, then states may wish to lower barriers to entry for 
smaller firms in their respective states.   
Reducing barriers such as lowering bonding requirements, and impact fees may lower 
operating costs for firms and provide an opportunity for smaller firms with low profit margins to 
start an oil and gas company in a state.  This may be advantageous for a state because small, 
homegrown firms may keep more of the revenue from O&G development inside the state’s 
economy.  Overall, if the risks associated with certain operator attributes can be brought to light, 
this information may be used by policy makers to help craft new and revise old regulations.  This 
study intends to answer the question of whether or not operator size is a predictor of state 
environmental and administrative compliance violations.  This question will be addressed using 
historic oil and gas well inspection and compliance data from two states active in the 
unconventional oil and gas industry.  To accompany a dataset analysis, interviews with relevant 
industry stakeholders were used to look at general industry trends and assumptions.   
 Section II of the paper describes the methods used in this analysis.  Section III discusses 
the results of the informational interviews and data analysis.  Section IV is a discussion of the 
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results and an interpretation of their meaning.  Section V highlights the relevant conclusions of 
the study and the implications of the results for policy makers and the industry. 
Section II 
Methods and Data: 
Operator Compliance: 
	  
 In an attempt to quantify the influence of observable operator attributes on state 
environmental and compliance risk; operator, well, and compliance data were collected from two 
states that have been actively engaged in fracking and oil and gas development for at least the 
last 15 years.  Pennsylvania and Colorado were selected as the two example states due to the 
large number of oil and gas wells in each state19 and the quality and accessibility of each state’s 
reporting program.20  For each state, well inspection data for each unconventional well in the 
state was collected from January 1, 2005 through November 1, 2014.  Each well is associated 
with a state permit and an operator of record.21  The operator of record is responsible for all 
events that occur on or at the well site, including the actions of any contractor that the operator of 
record brings on site.  If a well changes ownership during the years of interest, the new owner 
becomes the operator of record once the permitting has been approved.22 
 Well and well site inspections may occur at any time and are generally routine during the 
production phase of a well; however, inspections are not mandated at or along monthly or yearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 From 2005 to 2014, Pennsylvania has had 11,572 unconventional wells inspected.  From 2005 to 2014, Colorado 
had 17,494 unconventional wells inspected. 
20 Pennsylvania and Colorado each have reporting mandates, however, there are some concerns about the accuracy 
of these reporting systems.  
21 25 Pa. Code  § 78.11-33 
22 25 Pa. Code  § 78.13-15	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intervals in either state.23  However, inspections are somewhat predictable when major events or 
changes take place at a well site.  Inspections often take place before, during, and after drilling 
has been completed.24  The greatest potential for violations occurs during the drilling process of 
the well due to the presence of fracking fluid, drilling equipment, and produced water onsite.   
Consequently, this is also the point at which the majority of inspections take place.25 Inspections 
may look for compliance with a number of regulations at once, including both environmental and 
administrative regulations.  Administrative violations are incidences in which an operator has 
violated a regulation; however, that violation does not pose a threat to the environment.    
 Information on each operator of record active during the time period of concern (2005-
2014) was also collected.  This information includes specifics regarding attributes of interest of 
each operator.  Aggregating the attributes of each company allowed for the sorting of operators 
based on the size of each company’s operations.  Using the size of operation, as well as a number 
of other attributes, regressions were run to test the influence of operator size on the mean number 
of violations committed or assessed per inspection.     
Pennsylvania: 
In Pennsylvania, oil and gas well data was collected from the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Oil and Gas Program.  The DEP collects data and 
maintains a database containing the location and inspection information of every oil and gas well 
drilled or permitted in the state.26  The organization also collects and manages the state’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 PA 78 P.S. § 78.902 
24 PA 78 P.S. § 78.902 
25 Eyer J. Does Size Matter? The Effect of Firm Size on Fracking Safety. 2014. 
26 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Oil and Gas Reports. 2014. 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/oil_and_gas_reports/20297	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compliance reports for wells drilled in the state.27  Under the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act,28 
Coal and Gas Resource Coordination Law29, and PA Act 13 of 201230 the authority to regulate 
and inspect the oil and gas industry has been delegated to the PA DEP.  According to PA Act 13, 
the department may make inspections, conduct tests or sampling, and review records pertinent to 
a matter under investigation.31  In order to do this, an authorized agent at all reasonable times 
may enter and examine any involved property, facility, operation or activity.32  The owner, 
operator, or other person in charge of the property or facility under the chapter, upon 
presentation of identification for the purpose of inspection, must provide free and unrestricted 
entry and access to the property and facility.33 
With regards to the type and frequency of inspections conducted by the DEP, the 
department is not obligated by state regulation to conduct a minimum or maximum number of 
inspections per year, or over a certain period of time.34  However, the Department does intend to 
conduct inspections in accordance with the following table.35  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Id.	  
28	  PA	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Act,	  58	  P.S.	  §	  601.101-­‐601.605	  
29	  PA	  Coal	  and	  Gas	  Resource	  Conservation	  Law,	  58	  P.S.	  §	  501-­‐518	  	  
30	  PA	  ACT	  13	  (2012)	  
31	  58	  P.S.	  §	  3258(a)	  
32	  58	  P.S.	  §	  3258(a)	  
33	  58	  P.S.	  §	  3258(b)	  
34	  PA	  78	  P.S.	  §	  78.902	  
35	  PA	  78	  P.S.	  §	  78.903	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Table 1. Frequency of Inspections in Pennsylvania. 
Frequency of Inspections 
The Department, its employees and agents intend to conduct inspections at the following 
frequencies: 
1 At least once prior to the issuance of a permit, if a waiver or exception is requested by the permit 
applicant. 
2 At least once in verifying or resolving objections or determining the Department’s response to 
objections, when objections are raised to a permit application. 
3 At least once during each of the phases of siting, drilling, casing, cementing, completing, 
altering and stimulating a well. 
4 At least once during, or within 3 months after, the time period in which the owner or operator is 
required to restore the site, after drilling the well. 
5 At least once prior to the authorization to use an alternate method for plugging, casing or 
equipping the well. 
6 At least once during the periods that an alternative method for plugging, casing or equipping the 
well is being used or installed. 
7 At least once when a well is being reconditioned or repaired or when casing is being replaced. 
8 At least once prior to a well being granted inactive status. 
9 At least once during the plugging of the well. 
10 At least once during, or within 3 months after, the period in which the owner or operator is 
required to restore the site, after the well is plugged or abandoned. 
11 At least once before the bond or other financial security is released. 
12 At least once a year, if there is onsite brine disposal or residual waste disposal subject to the 
statutes referenced in § 78.902 (relating to policy). 
13 At least twice a year if the well is located in a gas storage reservoir or in a gas storage reservoir 
protective area. 
14 At least once a year to determine whether compliance with the statutes administered by the 
Department has been achieved. 
15 If there is a violation, at least once to determine whether the violation has been corrected, or 
whether there is a continuing violation. 
16 At least once, in response to a complaint.      
 
 In short, the PA DEP has the authority to inspect a well site whenever a new event occurs 
at the site and intends to inspect every well at least once a year.  However, the statutes and 
regulations do not force or command the DEP to conduct specific inspections.  In fact, the 
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Administrative code contains a provision limiting the inspections of the Department’s Oil and 
Gas Program to be subject to the availability of personnel and financial resources.36 
The DEP manages state inspectors and sends them out to conduct inspections when the 
Department deems it pertinent.  The DEP has the authority to hand out violations during an 
inspection if the inspector finds an issue that is not in compliance with the state’s regulations.  
An inspector may level an administrative or an environmental violation.  Administrative 
violations are violations generally dealing with issues related to paperwork and recordkeeping, 
while environmental violations are infractions that could lead to environmental or public health 
damage.  Following an inspection, the inspector reports back to the Department the results of the 
inspection and the Department may then levy a fee for violations or impose some other 
constraint on the operator’s actions.37  Finally, the DEP will publish the inspection results on the 
department’s state website for public viewing.38          
For this study, DEP well inspection data, published on the Department’s website, was 
used to analyze the compliance histories of individual operators within the state.  From this data 
set, the number of total inspections (administrative and environmental)39 conducted for 
unconventional hydraulically fractured wells was collected as well as the number of violations 
associated with those individual inspections between January 1, 2005 and November 1, 2014.  
Each inspection was linked to an individual operator of record.  Information on each of the 103 
operators active in PA during this time was collected and the following attributes were recorded 
from the Internet and market research about each firm.  Information was collected on: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 PA 78 P.S. § 78.906 
37 PA 58 § 2308, § 2310, § 3256, § 3260 
38 PA Department of Environmental Protection. Oil and Gas Reports. 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/oil_and_gas_reports/20297  
39 Total inspections include: Administrative, complaint, construction, compliance, drilling, follow-up, incident, 
routine, pre-operation, plugging, and site restoration. 
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organizational structure of the firm, market cap, multi-state operations, location of headquarters, 
year of incorporation, PA starting date, years of operation in PA, international operations, and 
total number of wells owned.  
Table 2.  Example of attributes collected for PA operators of record. 
Operator Anadarko Alliance 
Petroleum 
T&F 
Exploration 
Public/Private Public Private Private 
Market Cap $38,110,392,751 0 0 
Multi-State yes yes no 
Headquarters TX OH PA 
Year of 
Incorporation 
1959 1985 1998 
PA starting date 2008 2009 2009 
Years of 
Operation in PA 
7 1 6 
International yes no no 
Total Wells 15000 3764 6 
 
 Using these attributes, each operator was assigned a size designation based on a weighted 
score of attribute values: the larger the operator score, the larger the firm.  Companies were 
separated into three size bins based on attribute score.  Small firms = 1, Medium firms = 2, and 
Large firms = 3.40 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Appendix 7 
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Table 3.  Example of PA size weighting system.41 
Operator	   Number	  
of	  
States	  
Year	  
Incorporated	  
International	   Public	  /	  
Private	  
Market	  
Cap	  
Number	  of	  
Inspections	  
Sum	   Size	  
ANADARKO	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   15	   Large	  
ALLIANCE	  
PETROLEUM	  
2.5	   1.5	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6	   Medium	  
T	  &	  F	  
EXPLORATION	  
LP	  
1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   3.5	   Small	  
 
The attributes used to calculated operator size were: the number of states the operator was active 
in, the number of years the company has been active, whether or not the company is 
international, whether or not the company is public or private, the company’s estimated market 
cap, and the number of inspections of a company’s wells between 2005 and 2014.  The list below 
explains the attributes used to calculate a company’s size. 
• Number of States: The number of states a company is active in.  This is important because the 
more states a company is involved in may be an indicator that the company has substantial 
resources and is therefore potentially a larger company than a firm active in only one or two 
states.  Data obtained from operator websites.  
• Year Incorporated:  The number of years from 2014 that the company has been active.  This 
may be relevant because newer companies are less likely to have had the time to expand in size 
like older companies have.  Data obtained from operator websites. 
• International:  Whether or not a company has international oil and gas operations.  International 
or multinational companies are more likely to have greater capital resources than smaller 
companies and therefore would be more likely to be larger than strictly domestic companies on 
average.  Data obtained from operator websites. 
• Public/Private:  Whether or not the company is publicly held.  Public companies on average are 
thought to be larger than private companies in the oil and gas industry.  Public companies have 
access to large amounts of capital and are hypothetically capable of expanding more rapidly than 
private companies.  Data gathered from operator websites. 
• Market Cap:  The estimated market cap for public companies.  Market cap data provides 
information on the value of all of the assets of a company.  Larger companies generally have 
more assets.  Data gathered from Yahoo Finance on December 15, 2014.  
• Number of Inspections:  The number of inspections of an operator’s wells in PA.  A larger 
number of inspections may indicate that the company has been active and established for a 
number of years and has many wells.  Data gathered from the PA DEP.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Small (1-6), Medium (6-13.5), Large (14-18) 
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Using the size ranking and associated attributes, a negative binomial regression model was 
used to estimate the effect of firm size (as well as complimentary other attributes) on operator 
compliance at oil and gas well sites in PA.  A negative binomial regression was used because of 
the nature of the data collected.  The number of violations committed per inspection can be 
classified as count data and is not a continuous variable.  With discrete count data, a poisson 
model is generally used to test the likelihood of the occurrence of an event.  However, in this 
instance, the data collected does not fit the distributional assumption that the conditional mean of 
the data equals the conditional variance.  In Pennsylvania over 50,000 inspections were 
conducted between 2005 and 2014, and over 40,000 of those inspections resulted in the 
occurrence of no violation.  Due to extreme over-dispersion, the data does not fit the 
distributional requirements of a standard poisson model.  If the conditional distribution of the 
outcome variable is over-dispersed, the confidence intervals for the negative binomial are likely 
to be smaller than a comparable poisson model.42  Due to this over-dispersion, a negative 
binomial regression was run instead due to the fact that the negative binomial model allows for 
over-dispersion by estimating a parameter that separates the conditional mean and conditional 
variance.43   
The treatment effect in this regression is the size of the firm that owns or operates the 
unconventional well at the time of inspection. While operator size is the treatment, the data was 
collected at the well level.  Therefore, there was a mismatch in the data between the hierarchical 
level of the treatment and the point at which the data was collected.  In order to ensure 
independence among observations, the data was clustered at the operator level.  Clustering at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Stata	  Annotated	  Output:	  Negative	  Binomial	  Regression.	  Institute	  for	  Digital	  Research	  and	  Education.	  UCLA.	  
Accessed	  2015.	  http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm	  
43	  Eyer	  J.	  Does	  Size	  Matter?	  The	  Effect	  of	  Firm	  Size	  on	  Fracking	  Safety.	  2014	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operator level ensures that all operators of the same size class are viewed as a single group.  
When this is done, there is independence at the operator level and corresponding dependence at 
the well level.  Doing this adjusts the standard errors, inflating them to account for differences 
among operators within the same size class.    
Using the negative binomial model, the mean number of violations expected to be issued 
at a well during an inspection of operator j (yj) is modeled as    
y! = β! +   β! size_2! + β! size_3! + β!(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙!) + 𝛽!(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠!)+ 𝛽!(ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠!) + ε! 
where, 
• yj is the likelihood of committing a violation during an inspection (mean number of 
violations per inspection) 
• β1(size_2) is the treatment effect of medium sized firms on the likelihood of violations 
• β2(size_3) is the treatment effect of large sized firms on the likelihood of violations  
• β3(international) is the effect of international status of operator j as of 12/1/2014.  
• Β4(numberofstates) is the effect of the number of states operator j is active in as of 
12/1/2014 
• Β5(headquarters) is the effect of whether or not company j has its corporate headquarters 
in PA (1/0)  
• εj is the error term  
 
The response variable (yj) in this model is the predicted mean number of violations assessed to 
an operator during any individual inspection.  The results of this model should indicate the 
predictive importance of the variables; size, number of states in operation, location of 
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headquarters, and international on the number of violations assessed or committed per 
inspection.  
 In order to correctly identify the treatment effect on the likelihood of violations in this 
negative binomial model, the model requires that the conditional distribution of our error terms 
has a mean of zero, the observations used are independently and identically distributed, there are 
no significant outliers, the variance of the error terms are constant, and perfect multicollinearity 
does not exist. 
Colorado: 
 In Colorado, The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act,44 authorizes the Colorado Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission to carry out and enforce oil and gas rules and procedures in 
the state.45  One important stage in enforcing the Oil and Gas Conservation Act is to inspect and 
monitor well sites on private land, as well as land owned by states and local governments for 
regulatory compliance.46  The Act charges the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(COGCC) with the regulatory authority to make rules and regulations to implement and enforce 
the nature of the Act.47  The COGCC or the Colorado Air Pollution Control Division (APCD) 
inspect the majority of oil and gas wells in CO.48  The COGCC regulates the physical oil and gas 
wells, while the APCD monitors air quality.  The COGCC is required by statute to develop 
Colorado’s oil and gas resources in a manner that is consistent with the protection of public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 C.R.S. § 34-60-101 to 130, (2014) 
45 C.R.S. § 34-60-104, (2014) 
46 The BLM has concurrent authority, along with the COGCC, to inspect federal oil and gas sites. 
47 C.R.S. § 34-60-101 to 130, (2014) 
48 Colorado Legislative Council Brief. Issue Brief: Inspections of Oil and Gas Development. (2013) 
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mu
ngoBlobs&blobwhere=1251915389800&ssbinary=true 
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health, the environment, and wildlife resources.49  However, the agency is not required by statute 
to inspect all wells throughout the state on a routine or periodic basis.50  In accordance with this 
directive, COGCC inspectors attempt to inspect wells when new activities occur at them, as well 
as inspect every well in the state every three years.51     
From 2005 through 2012, Colorado inspectors averaged approximately 1,000 well 
inspections per year.  However, there were less than 15 field inspectors working for the 
department during that time.52  Meanwhile, during this time period, the number of wells in CO 
increased from 29,000 to over 48,000.  While the number of field inspectors slowly increased 
with the number of wells in the state, over two-thirds of the wells in the state were not being 
inspected yearly.  In 2013, the Commission increased the number of inspectors to 23, but the 
enforcement authority was still only able to inspect 19,084 out of a possible 48,000 wells.53  To 
help to deal with this lack of enforcement and help direct the Commission on how to utilize its 
limited resources, the Colorado legislature enacted SB 13-202, which requires the COGCC to 
use a risk-based strategy for inspecting oil and gas locations in the state.54  This strategy directs 
inspectors to target the operational phases of an oil and gas well most likely to result in 
environmental contamination.  In theory this should focus inspections on the most high-risk areas 
of operation, but the legislation does not indicate how an inspector should judge or evaluate risk.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52  EarthWorks http://www.earthworksaction.org/images/uploads/Colorado-inspection-data-chart-673x468.gif, 
COGCC Annual Reports to Water Quality Control Commission. 2011. 
53 Colorado Legislative Council Brief. Issue Brief: Inspections of Oil and Gas Development. (2013) 
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mu
ngoBlobs&blobwhere=1251915389800&ssbinary=true 
54 Colorado Legislative Council Brief. Issue Brief: Inspections of Oil and Gas Development. (2013) 
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mu
ngoBlobs&blobwhere=1251915389800&ssbinary=true 
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Considering the limited personnel resources available to the COGCC, this presents an 
opportunity for inspectors to pick and choose which wells and operations are the most risky.  
In combination with Colorado’s small and underfunded oil and gas monitoring program, 
the administrative regulations encourage operator self-reporting to fill-in inspection gaps.  
Pursuant to Rule 523(e), a Colorado operator who maintains a regulatory compliance program55 
and voluntarily discloses to the Director a violation of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, or any 
Commission rule, order, or permit discovered as a direct result of such a program will have a 
rebuttable presumption of a penalty reduction, of at least 35% for a disclosed violation, if certain 
criteria are met.56  Under this program, a substantial number of violations reported to the 
regulatory body are done so by self-reporting.  The state’s regulations provide an incentive for 
operators to self-report; however, there is no guarantee how accurate or effective these self-
reporting programs are.    
The COGCC collects all of its inspection and self-reported data and publishes the 
statistics on the COGCC’s public website.  The COGCC collects data and maintains a database 
containing the location and information of every oil and gas well drilled or permitted in the 
state.57  The organization also collects and manages the state’s compliance reports.58  From these 
data sets, the number of total inspections59 conducted for unconventional hydraulically fractured 
wells was collected as well as the number of violations (both environmental and administrative) 
associated with those individual inspections.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 State program designed for oil and gas operators to illustrate how they intend to comply with state regulations. 
Rule 100. 
56 CO admin code Rule 523(e)(1) 
57 Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. http://cogcc.state.co.us/ 
58 Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. http://cogcc.state.co.us/ 
59 Total inspections include: Administrative, complaint, compliance, drilling, spill, routine, pre-operation, plugging, 
and remediation. 
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As in Pennsylvania, each inspection was linked to an individual operator of record.  
Information on each of the 170 operators’ active in CO between 2005 and 2014 was collected 
and the following attributes of each firm were recorded from internet and market research.  
Information was collected on: organizational structure, market cap, multi-state operations, 
location of headquarters, year of incorporation, number of wells in CO, international operations, 
and total number of owned wells. 
Using these attributes, each operator was assigned a size designation based on a weighted 
score of attribute values: the larger the operator score, the larger the firm.  As in Pennsylvania, 
companies were separated into three size bins based on attribute score.  Small firms = 1, Medium 
firms = 2, and Large firms = 3. 
Table 4.  Example of CO size weighting system. 
Operator	   Number	  
of	  
States	  
Year	  
Incorporated	  
International	   Public	  
/	  
Private	  
Market	  
Cap	  
Number	  of	  
Inspections	  
Sum	   Size	  
BP	  America	  Production	  
Company	  
4	   1.5	   2	   2	   4	   3	   16.5	   Large	  
Elm	  Ridge	  Exploration	  
Company	  LLC	  
2.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   2	   6.5	   Medium	  
Fees	  Jr	  and	  Son	  Oil	  and	  
Gas	  
1	   1.5	   0	   0	   1	   1	   4.5	   Small	  
 
• Number of States: The number of states a company is active in.  This is important because the 
more states a company is involved in may be an indicator that the company has substantial 
resources and is therefore potentially a larger company than a firm active in only one or two 
states.  Data obtained from operator websites.  
• Year Incorporated:  The number of years from 2014 that the company has been active.  This 
may be relevant because newer companies are less likely to have had the time to expand in size 
like older companies have.  Data obtained from operator websites. 
• International:  Whether or not a company has international oil and gas operations.  International 
or multinational companies are more likely to have greater capital resources than smaller 
companies and therefore would be more likely to be larger than strictly domestic companies on 
average.  Data obtained from operator websites. 
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• Public/Private:  Whether or not the company is publicly held.  Public companies on average are 
thought to be larger than private companies in the oil and gas industry.  Public companies have 
access to large amounts of capital and are hypothetically capable of expanding greater than 
private companies.  Data gathered from operator websites. 
• Market Cap:  The estimated market cap for public companies.  Market cap data provides 
information on the value of all of the assets of a company.  Larger companies generally have 
more assets.  Data gathered from Yahoo Finance.  
• Number of Inspections:  The number of inspections of an operator’s wells in CO.  A larger 
number of inspections may indicate that the company has been active and established for a 
number of years and has many wells.  Data gathered from the COGCC.  
 
Using the size ranking and associated operator attributes, a negative binomial regression 
model was run to estimate the effect of firm size (as well as other operator attributes) on operator 
compliance at oil and gas well sites in Colorado.  A negative binomial regression was used 
because of the over-dispersed nature of the count data collected.  While there were over 81,000 
inspections between 2005 and 2014, over 90% of those inspections were conducted without a 
reported violation.  Due to the extreme over-dispersion associated with so many zeros in the 
count data, the data does not fit the distributional requirements of a standard Poisson model.  Due 
to this over-dispersion, a negative binomial regression was run instead.   
A negative binomial regression is an extension of a Poisson model that corrects for 
overdispersion.  If the conditional distribution of the outcome variable is over-dispersed, the 
confidence intervals for the negative binomial are likely to be smaller than a comparable Poisson 
model.60  A negative binomial model compensates for over-dispersion by estimating dispersion 
so that it separates the conditional mean and conditional variance.61   
As in Pennsylvania, the treatment effect in this model is the size of the firm that is the 
owner/operator of the unconventional well at the time of inspection.  In order to ensure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Stata Annotated Output: Negative Binomial Regression. Institute for Digital Research and Education. UCLA. 
Accessed 2015. http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm 
61 Eyer J. Does Size Matter? The Effect of Firm Size on Fracking Safety. 2014. 
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independence among observations, the data was clustered at the operator level to ensure that all 
operators of the same size class are viewed as a group and that there is independence at the 
operator level and corresponding dependence at the well level.  Doing this adjusts the standard 
errors, inflating them to account for differences among operators within the same size class. 
The mean number of violations expected to be assessed at a well during an inspection of 
operator j (yj) is modeled as  
y! = β! + β! size_2! + β! size_3! + 𝛽! 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠! +   𝛽! 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠!+   𝛽!(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  !) + ε! 
where, 
• yj is the likelihood of committing a violation during an inspection (mean number of 
violations per inspection) 
• β1(size_2) is the treatment effect of medium sized firms on the likelihood of committing a 
violation 
• 𝛽!(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_3) is the treatment effect of large firms on the likelihood of committing a 
violation. 
• β3(numberofstates) is the treatment effect of the number of states that firm j operates in. 
• β4(headquarters) is the treatment effect of operator j having its headquarters within CO. 
• β5(international) is the treatment effect of operator j having international operations.  
• εj is the error term  
The response variable in this model is the likelihood of having a violation assessed to the 
operator during any individual inspection.  The results of this model indicate the predictive 
importance of the variables, size, location of headquarters, international component of company, 
and the number of states an operator is active.  
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In order to correctly identify the treatment effect on the likelihood of violations in a 
negative binomial regression, the model requires that the conditional distribution of our error 
terms has a mean of zero, the observations are independently and identically distributed, there 
are no significant outliers, the variance of the error terms are constant, and perfect 
multicollinearity does not exist. 
Industry Assumptions:  Interviews with Stakeholders: 
	  
 To better understand how the supposed risk between operators of different sizes is 
perceived by those actively involved in the industry, a series of informational interviews were 
conducted with relevant stakeholders and industry experts.  14 individuals were interviewed 
from different perspectives in and around the industry.  Individuals were interviewed from 
environmental groups, state regulators, small oil and gas operators, and representatives of large 
operators.  These four groupings of individuals and firms can be thought of as being the four 
main groups of stakeholders concerned with oil and gas activities at the well site.  While they are 
certainly not the only groups affected or interested in unconventional oil and gas development, 
their voices are the loudest and most politically influential.  It is also possible that the views of 
other groups outside of these four are encompassed in the perspectives of the groups interviewed 
here. 
 These four groups are distinct because of their differing approaches and opinions towards 
the oil and gas industry.  Environmental groups are more likely to be concerned with 
environmental protection than efficiency of extraction, while oil and gas companies may be more 
interested in feasibility and operational bottom lines than state regulators.  While they may all be 
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experts in the industry, they potentially address industry questions and problems from different 
perspectives.  
By interviewing individuals from these four interest groups, a modest perspective of the 
industry can be gathered and some potential trends may be pulled out.  However, with a sample 
size of only 14 interviews, a comprehensive analysis of the industry as a whole is difficult.  The 
interviews were conducted in person or over the telephone when appropriate.     
 Interviewees were ask questions regarding their individual views, as well as what the 
industry as a whole believes are the differences between large and small companies engaged in 
unconventional gas development.62  Questions were also asked about the perceived risk of 
certain types of companies operating within oil and gas industry and the likelihood of those 
companies to commit environmental and administrative violations.  Following questions about 
perceived relative compliance risk of companies of different sizes, individuals were asked about 
the purpose of state regulations and the efficiency and effectiveness of state regulatory programs.  
 With regards to the strength and effectiveness of regulatory programs, interviewees were 
asked about the regulatory capabilities of state regulators and the consistency of the 
interpretation and implementation of regulations by inspectors.  Individuals were asked whether 
or not regulatory agencies are capable of regulating companies of differing sizes equally and if 
inspectors interact with large and small companies the same way. 
 Finally, those involved in the informational interviews were asked about the accuracy of 
the compliance reporting programs that states such as Pennsylvania and Colorado use to keep the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Appendix 8.  Copy of questions posed to interviewees 
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public informed of oil and gas issues.  These types of datasets are the datasets that are being used 
in this analysis to quantify the effect of operator size on compliance.   
Table 5.  Example of questions asked during informational interviews.63 
Number Question 
1 - Are there discernable differences between operators of different sizes operating 
at the well site in the unconventional oil and gas industry?  
2 - Does the industry perceive there to be any differences in regulatory compliance 
between small and large companies?  Administrative v. Environmental? 
3 - Do you, in your professional capacity, believe that there is a difference in 
compliance between companies of different sizes? 
4 - Are state regulatory agencies capable of regulating large and small processors 
equally? 
5 - How accurate are state violation reporting programs and are these programs 
evenly enforced? 
 
 The human subjects used for these interviews were collected using the interviewer’s 
personal contacts in the oil and gas industry.  A snowball sampling technique was then used to 
network with individuals in each of the four groups willing to participate in the study.  While the 
individuals sampled do not constitute a random sample of the four stakeholder perspectives, they 
do provide an example subsample of the four stakeholder groups.  While it is statistically 
preferable to randomly sample the population of these groups, the realities of the industry and the 
responsiveness of stakeholders made this difficult for the interviewer.  
 Within the environmental group, individuals with experience working on fracking issues 
in Pennsylvania, Colorado, and North Carolina were sampled.  In the regulator group, current or 
former state regulators were consulted from Pennsylvania and North Carolina.  Representatives 
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of small and large operators that are or have been operational in Colorado and Pennsylvania were 
also interviewed during the study.  Stakeholder responses were then qualitatively analyzed to 
look at general trends in perception among stakeholder groups.       
Section III 
Results: 
Stakeholder responses: 
	  
Of the 14 individuals interviewed during this study concerning the influence of operator 
size on environmental risk in the unconventional oil and gas industry, 13 of the 14 indicated that 
there is a general industry assumption that smaller companies are environmentally riskier than 
larger companies (Figure 1).  The other individual, a representative of a small oil and gas 
company, responded that this assumption may be the case, but he is not sure. 
 
  
	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Number of responses to interview question about whether or not the oil and gas 
industry as a whole assumes that small companies are riskier than larger companies.   
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 This response suggests that there may be a strong assumption among those involved in 
the oil and gas industry that differences exist between operators of different types and sizes, and 
that the industry assumes that smaller firms present more risk than larger ones.   However, when 
these same individuals were asked what their own personal beliefs about the riskiness of oil and 
gas companies of differing sizes, responses were less uniform (Figure 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of responses to interview question about whether or not the respondent 
believes that small companies are riskier than larger companies.   
  
The results of Figure 2 suggest there may be much more uncertainty about this 
assumption at the individual level than at the level of the industry as a whole.  The majority of 
respondents indicated that there may be some level of truth behind this assumption; however, 
they have not seen any direct evidence suggesting that this is in fact the case.  All respondents 
gave anecdotal evidence as to why larger companies may be safer than smaller ones, however; 
only four provided a rationale with strong conviction. 
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For example, multiple environmental representatives and regulators suggested that 
smaller companies may be more likely to commit/be assessed violations than larger companies 
due to the fact that these companies generally do not have the technology, expertise, and 
experience that many larger firms have.  Regulators suggested that larger companies have greater 
access to capital and engineering advancements that would allow them to operate more 
efficiently and safer than smaller firms without the latest technological advancements.64  This 
assumes that new, high priced technologies increase safety in the oil and gas industry and that 
smaller firms do not have access to this technology. 
Interviewees also indicated that an assumption about industry experience and expertise 
has shaped their view, creating the belief that smaller companies may be more risky than larger 
firms.  Nearly all respondents indicated that it is most likely the case that smaller companies 
have less expertise than larger ones.  As one large operator indicated, large companies have 
redundant expertise in the sense that they have drilled and operated more of the same types of 
wells over a longer period of time than many small operators.65  Along with redundancy, large 
operators are thought to have the funds to hire the best geologists and the strongest and most 
experienced labor force.66  If this is true, then larger companies may be able to use this expertise 
and long-standing knowledge of the industry to more aptly comply with state regulations.   
 While these reasons have been provided as anecdotal evidence that larger companies are 
better able to comply with regulations and are therefore less risky than smaller companies, hard 
evidence may not currently exist to support this conclusion.  
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When asked whether or not this assumption has been expressed in state regulations across 
the country, responses were mixed (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Number of responses to the interview question: Have states incorporated an 
assumption that smaller companies are more risky into their regulations? 
 
Less than half of those interviewed strongly believed that assumptions about the risks associated 
with operator size have influenced state regulations.  Most individuals did not believe that states 
have actively crafted regulations aimed to mitigate the supposed risk of small companies.  
However, a significant number of interviewees reported that some regulations have the effect of 
being barriers to entry for small operators, yet were not designed for that purpose.67  These types 
of regulations include bonding requirements, severance taxes, and impact fees.68  These results 
and anecdotal evidence may indicate that although some states may not be actively attempting to 
mitigate the perceived risk of certain types of companies relative to others, regulations with other 
intentions may be having this effect. 
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 When asked about regulatory regimes and the ability of state programs to regulate 
effectively in a non-biased manner, all respondents suggested that states have difficulty 
consistently implementing rules and regulations in the oil and gas industry.  When directly asked 
the question whether or not states regulate all companies equally, only two respondents answered 
yes.  The remaining answers to this question were nearly evenly distributed among maybe and no 
(Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Number of responses to the interview question: Do states regulate all companies 
equally independent of operator size? 
 
 
 Respondents across stakeholder type indicated that there are significant implementation 
issues at the state level.  All interviewees noted that state regulatory programs are underfunded 
and overworked, and that regulators are most likely doing good work with their available 
resources.69  However, these resources are not sufficient to provide the level of inspection and 
oversight that the public often demands and that the industry requires.  Due to budgetary 
constraints and a lack of man-hours, all stakeholders indicated that state regulatory programs 
were lacking in one form or another.   
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Many respondents indicated that state programs are likely to regulate company types 
differently because of this of resource constraint.  Some suggested that state regulators would be 
less likely to fine or issue a violation to large operators for an illegal event than a small operator.  
An environmental representative and a state regulator suggested that this would manifest itself 
due to the political strength and pressure of larger companies.70  Other individuals stated that 
regulators are more likely to work with large companies to avoid violations than smaller 
companies due to the large number of wells generally owned by large operators.71  These 
individuals believe that if a regulator sees that a large company has an event that would require 
the administration of a violation, that regulator may be more willing to help the company fix the 
problem without issuing the violation because that operator could then hypothetically fix that 
problem on all of his or her other wells in the state.72  By helping the operator avoid a violation 
at one well, theory suggests that the regulator could prevent future violations at other wells.  
Small operators with a fewer number of wells may not be extended this courtesy.73   
While this sentiment predominantly held through the majority of the interviews, one 
regulator suggested that administrative violations are lower for small companies when compared 
to larger companies.74  This is not due to the fact that small companies are more adept to handle 
paperwork, but instead due to the idea that regulators are likely to underreport administrative 
violations from small companies, with the idea of attempting to give these types of companies a 
break to help them get their foot in the door.75 
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Finally, with respect to the accuracy of state violation and compliance reporting, the 
overwhelming majority of stakeholders interviewed expressed skepticism about the accuracy of 
reporting systems (Figure 5).  Nearly all interviewees, regardless of stakeholder perspective, 
indicated that state compliance databases are most likely either incomplete, due to missing data, 
or skewed due to inspector bias.  Most individuals attributed the incomplete nature of the 
databases to a lack of resources available to the state regulatory agencies tasked with carrying 
out this objective.76    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Number of responses to the interview question: Are state reporting programs and 
databases accurate and representative?  
 
 
A lack of confidence in state required disclosure databases may indicate that compliance 
and violation data from these reporting systems are unreliable.  However, they are the best data 
currently available to study compliance trends in the industry.      
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Regression Statistics: 
	  
 In Pennsylvania, the number of unconventional oil and gas wells has dramatically 
increased since 2005.  In 2005, there were only 13 unconventional oil and gas wells in the state; 
however, the number of wells drastically increased through the end of the decade and begun to 
slow in recent years (Figure 6).  An increase in the number of wells corresponds with an increase 
in state inspections (Figure 6).  Increases in inspections appear to be at a similar rate as increases 
in wells drilled indicating that the state has been able to stay fairly constant in its inspection 
regime despite regulatory changes from 2005 through 2012 (Figure 7).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Number of wells and inspections in PA between 2005 and 2014. 
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Figure 7.  Percentage of Pennsylvania wells inspected from 2005 to 2014. 
 
 
While there is significant concern about the environmental safety of the hydraulic 
fracturing industry in the United States, the relative safety of the industry seems to be improving 
through time.  In Pennsylvania for example, within the Marcellus shale formation, Considine et 
al. (2012) found in their research that there was a 60% decline in environmentally damaging 
events between 2008 and 2012.77  This corresponds with a decrease in the total number of 
violations per inspection from 2006 to 2014 (Figure 8). 
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  Timothy Considine, Robert Watson, Nicholas Considine, and John Martin. Environ- mental impacts during 
marcellus shale gas drilling: Causes, impacts, and remedies. Technical report, State University of New York at 
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Figure 8.  Number of violations per inspection in PA from 2005 to 2014. (Industry wide)  
 
From 2006 through 2014, Pennsylvania has consistently attempted to strengthen their oil 
and gas regulations in response to numerous environmental mishaps and pollution incidences.78  
This strengthening of regulations corresponds with an uptick in the likelihood of violations at an 
inspection.  However, violations peak around 0.25 violations per inspection in the latter months 
of 2009 and steadily decline to about 0.03 violations per inspection in 2014.  While the number 
of inspections per well has remained fairly constant over this time period (Figure 7), this result 
may indicates that fracking companies responded to stronger regulations and began acting in a 
more compliant manner.  While the number of inspections per year has stayed somewhat 
constant over the last four years, the number of violations has fallen dramatically.  Considering 
that PA has strengthened its rules over this time period, it may be the case that unconventional 
oil and gas development has become less environmentally risky over the last decade.  While the 
industry as a whole in PA appears to be improving by way of compliance, a question still 
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remains as to whether or not all operators are improving, or whether some types of operators are 
more compliant than others.  
 In Colorado, as in Pennsylvania, the number of wells and inspections has increased at a 
fairly similar rate.  Unlike Pennsylvania, Colorado has a long history of oil and gas development, 
and has been active in the unconventional oil and gas space for a number of years prior to 2005.  
In fact, in 2005, the state already had over 25,000 wells in the ground (Figure 9).  The number of 
wells drilled steadily increased over the decade, and by 2014, there were over 50,000 wells in 
CO (Figure 9).  The state’s inspection regime has kept pace with this increase in wells (albeit at 
an inspection level incapable of monitoring every well each year), maintaining an inspection per 
well ratio around 0.3 for much of time period between 2005 and 2012 (Figure 10).  The sharp 
uptick in inspections in CO in 2013 can be attributed to the implementation in 2013 of two 
regulatory reform bills, SB 13-20279 and HB 13-127880 and the hiring of more inspectors (Figure 
11).  These two bills provided more direction for the COGCC in its regulatory efforts and 
increased funding to the agency.  Overall, Colorado has an underwhelming inspection program 
(only 28 inspectors in 2014), however, this inspection program has stayed relatively consistent 
over the first 8 years of this study.  
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Figure 9.  Number of Wells and number of well inspections in CO between 2005 and 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Number of Inspections per well in Colorado from 2005 to 2014. 
 
 
 
0	  
10000	  
20000	  
30000	  
40000	  
50000	  
60000	  
2005	  2006	  2007	  2008	  2009	  2010	  2011	  2012	  2013	  2014	  
N
um
be
r	  o
f	  I
ns
pe
cY
on
s	  o
r	  W
el
ls
	  
year	  
Wells	  and	  InspecYons	  in	  CO	  
Number	  of	  
Wells	  
Number	  of	  
Inspec`ons	  
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
0.7	  
2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
In
sp
ec
Yo
ns
	  p
er
	  W
el
l	  	  
year	  
Colorado	  InspecYons	  per	  Well	  
	  
	  
36	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Number of Inspectors working for the COGCC from 2005 to 2014 
 
 
Colorado: 
The statistical analysis and negative binomial regression of compliance and violation data 
from Colorado suggests that all companies engaged in shale gas development and production are 
not equally compliant.  170 companies have operated unconventional oil and gas wells in 
Colorado between 2005 and 2014.  Of those 170 companies, 74 have been designated as “small” 
companies, 52 as “medium” companies, and 43 as “large” companies from the size scoring 
system described earlier (Figure 12).  While there may be fewer large operators than small 
operators in CO, larger operators own significantly more wells than medium or small firms, and 
consequently have many more inspections than those firms (Figure 13).   
The mean number of violations committed during an inspection for each of the three 
groups of operators between 2005 and 2014 appears to differ.  Smaller companies appear to have 
a larger number of violations per inspection when compared to medium or large companies; 
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however, the variance of each group is quite high due to large variation within groups and the 
presence of outliers (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Number of operators in Colorado by operator size. (2005-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Number of Inspections and violations by operator size in Colorado. (2005-2014) 
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Table 6.  Colorado mean number of violations per inspection by operator size 
Size Operators Mean Variance Min Max Inspections 
1 74 0.1582 0.4115 0 1.0126 6296 
2 52 0.0706 0.2340 0 0.3854 27935 
3 43 0.0411 0.1345 0 0.3333 47262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Number of violations per inspection in Colorado by operator size. (2005-2014) 
 
 
 The Colorado data appears to suggest that differences in means exist between operators 
of different size.  Table 6 indicates that the mean number of violations per inspection for small 
operators (0.1582) is approximately three times greater than the mean number of violations for 
large operators (0.0411). Medium sized companies (0.0706) appear to fall in the midpoint 
between small and large companies (Figure 14).      
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 To test whether or not these means are statically significant, a two way anova comparison 
of means test was run on the likelihood data for each company size.  The anova results (Table 7) 
suggest that the means of the three groups are statistically different from one another (p<0.000), 
however, by itself, company size is not a great predictor of the likelihood of violations or a 
strong explainer of the variation in violation data (R2=0.005).  
 
Table 7.  Anova statistical mean results for CO size data. 
Colorado	  Anova	  Test	  of	  Means	  Results	  
	          
Source	   	  	  
Sum	  of	  
Squares	  	   df	   F	   p	  
Model	  	  
	  
80.071	   2	   210.72	   0.0000	  
Size	  	  
	  
80.071	   2	   210.72	   0.0000	  
Residual	  	   	  	   15482.8	   81490	   	  	   	  	  
R	  squared	   0.005	  
	      
 To better understand the effect of size and other operator attributes on the likelihood of 
being assessed a violation during an inspection, a negative binomial regression was run using 
number of violations per inspection as the outcome variable and operator size as the treatment 
variable.  The explanatory variables used in the negative binomial model were operator size, the 
number of states the operator is active in, whether or not the company was international, and the 
location of the company’s headquarters.  The results of the model suggest that size, international 
status, location of headquarters, and number of states in operation are all inversely related to the 
mean number of violations per inspection (Table 8).  
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Table 8.  Negative binomial model for the impact of operator size on compliance in Colorado 
(2005-2014).  
 
Colorado	  Negative	  Binomial	  Regression	  
	       
Number	  of	  Violations	   	  	   Coefficient	  	   	  	  
Marginal	  
Effect	  
Medium	  Size	  
	  
-­‐0.8467**	  
(0.0756)	  
	  
-­‐0.0983**	  
(0.0287)	  
Large	  Size	  
	  
-­‐1.4941**	  
(0.3315)	  
	  
-­‐0.1334**	  
(0.0443)	  
International	  
	  
-­‐0.1744	  
(0.2586)	  
	  
-­‐0.0105	  
(0.0156)	  
Number	  of	  States	  
	  
-­‐0.0515**	  
(0.0092)	  
	  
-­‐0.0031**	  
(0.0006)	  
Headquarters	  
	  	  
-­‐0.5922*	  
(0.3319)	   	  	  
-­‐0.0357*	  
(0.0211)	  
Observations	  
	  
78211	  
	     
A negative binomial regression model, used to model count data, can provide an estimate 
of the impact of an individual variable on the number of occurrences of an event.  The model for 
Colorado indicates that all of the variables selected have a negative impact on the occurrence of 
violations per inspection.  With regards to size, the model estimates that an increase in operator 
size from small to medium leads to a decrease in the log count of violations per inspection by 
0.8467 (Table 8).  This can be interpreted as the marginal effect of shifting from a small to a 
medium sized operator, on average, led to a decrease in the number of violations per inspection 
by 0.0982 holding all else equal (Table 8). This result was highly significant at the 5% 
confidence level (p=0.001).  This result provides a strong reason to believe that there is a trend 
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towards fewer violations as a company increases in size from a small firm to a medium sized 
firm.  
 The results also estimate that an increase in size from a small firm to a large firm may 
lead to decrease in the log count of violations per inspection of 1.4942 in CO holding all else 
constant (Table 8).  This can be interpreted as the marginal effect of an increase in firm size from 
small to large is a decrease in the average number of violations per inspection of 0.1334 holding 
all else equal (Table 8).  This effect is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level 
(p=0.003) and indicates that there are significantly fewer violations committed per inspection by 
large companies compared to small companies.  Due to the high significance of the impact of 
operator size on violations, we can comfortably say that operator size has an impact on the 
number of violations per inspection in Colorado.  Increases in operator size appear to lead to 
decreases in total violations.   
 With regards to the impact of the operator’s international status on violations, the model 
suggests that international companies are likely to have fewer violations per inspection than 
strictly domestic companies.  The regression model estimates that a shift from a domestic 
company to an international firm, holding all else equal, will lead to a decrease in the expected 
log count of the number of violations per inspection by 0.1744 (Table 8).  This can be interpreted 
as a marginal change from a domestic to an international firm leads to an average decrease in the 
number of violations per inspection of 0.0105 (Table 8).  However, this result was not highly 
significant (p=0.501), indicating that the international nature of a firm does not strongly predict 
the number of violations per inspection in Colorado.  
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The location of the company’s headquarters also had an impact on the number of total 
violations per inspection in Colorado.  The model predicts that companies whose headquarters 
are in Colorado, when compared to companies whose headquarters are in other states, are likely 
to experience a decrease in the expected log count of the number of violations per inspection by 
0.5922 holding all else equal (Table 8).  This can be interpreted at the margins as a company that 
has its headquarters in CO is expected to have 0.0357 fewer violations reported per inspection 
than a company with headquarters outside of the state (Table 8).  This result is also not highly 
significant (p=0.091) at the 5% confidence level; however, it is significant at the 10% level.  
While not highly significant, the results do suggest that there is a trend in the data indicating that 
firms headquartered in Colorado are likely to commit fewer violations per inspection than firm 
firms incorporated outside of the state.  
 The final variable of interest in this model is the number of states an operator is active in.  
The model estimates that a one unit increase in number of states will lead to a decrease in the 
expected log count of the number of violations per inspection by 0.0514 holding all else constant 
(Table 8).  This may be interpreted at the margins as an increase in the number of states in 
operation by one state will, on average, decrease the number of violations per inspection by 
0.0031 (Table 8).  This result is highly significant at the 5% confidence level (p=0.000).  For this 
reason, we can assert with confidence that the number of states an operator is active in has a 
significant impact on operator compliance.          
 
Pennsylvania:  
  The statistical analysis and negative binomial regression of compliance and 
violation data from Pennsylvania suggests that all companies engaged in shale gas development 
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and production are not equally compliant.  103 companies have operated unconventional oil and 
gas wells in Pennsylvania between 2005 and 2014.  Of those 103 companies, 38 have been 
designated as “small” companies, 30 as “medium” companies, and 35 as “large” companies from 
the size rankings discussed in the Methods section (Figure 15).  While there are a similar number 
of small, medium, and large firms in the state, large firms own a vast majority of the state’s 
wells.  A larger number of wells correspond with a larger number of inspections (Figure 16).  
According to the data, the mean number of violations committed during an inspection is higher 
for smaller firms than for medium or large firms (Figure 17).  However, this difference is not 
dramatic, and there is considerable variation in the number of wells owned within the three size 
groups (Table 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Number of operators of differing size in Pennsylvania between 2005 and 2014. 
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Figure 16.  Number of inspections and violations by operator size in PA between 2005 and 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Number of violations per inspection by operator size in PA between 2005 and 2014 
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Table 9. Pennsylvania mean number of violations per inspection by operator size, 2005-2014 
Size Operators Mean Variance Min Max Inspections 
1 38 0.1359 0.3079 0 1.200 1766 
2 30 0.1132 0.4403 0 0.7073 8941 
3 35 0.0808 0.2678 0 0.6083 44426 
 
To test whether or not the differences between these means are statically significant, a 
two way anova comparison of means test was run on the likelihood data for each company size.  
The anova results (Table 10) suggest that the means of the three groups are statistically different 
from one another (p<0.000). However, this test does not indicate how the means differ or by how 
much.  Although this test provides interesting insight, company size alone is not a great predictor 
of the likelihood of violations and does not explain a significant amount of variation in the 
outcome variable (R2=0.007).  For this reason, higher order statistical analysis was used to tease 
out the impact of operator of record size on the number of violations reported during each 
inspection.  
 
Table 10. Anova statistical mean results for PA size data. 
 
Pennsylvania	  Anova	  Test	  of	  Means	  Results	  
	  
      
Source	   	  	  
Sum	  of	  
Squares	  	   df	   F	   p	  
Model	  	  
	  
11.927	   2	   20.07	   0.0000	  
Size	  	  
	  
11.927	   2	   20.07	   0.0000	  
Residual	  	   	  	   16378.48	   55130	   	  	   	  	  
R	  squared	   0.007	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To better understand the effect of size and other operator attributes on the likelihood of 
being assessed a violation during an inspection in Pennsylvania, a negative binomial regression 
was run using the number of violations per inspection as the outcome variable and size as the 
main treatment variable.  The explanatory variables used in the linear regression model were 
operator size, number of states the operator has active operations in, whether or not the 
company’s headquarters are in PA, and whether or not the company is international.  The results 
of the model suggest that all of the treatment variables are inversely correlated with the mean 
number of violations per inspection (Table 11).  
 
Table 11.  Results from the Clustered Pennsylvania Negative Binomial Regression Model (2005-
2014).  
 
Pennsylvania	  Negative	  Binomial	  Regression	  
	  
     
Number	  of	  Violations	   	  	   Coefficient	  	   	  	  
Marginal	  
Effect	  
Medium	  Size	  
	  
-­‐0.2582**	  
(0.0303)	  
	  
-­‐0.0310**	  
(0.0045)	  
Large	  Size	  
	  
-­‐0.5071**	  
(0.0414)	  
	  
-­‐0.0542**	  
(0.0058)	  
International	  
	  
-­‐0.3603**	  
(0.0329)	  
	  
-­‐0.0316**	  
(0.0031)	  
Number	  of	  States	  
	  
-­‐0.0101	  
(0.0097)	  
	  
-­‐0.0008	  
(0.0008)	  
Headquarters	  
	  	  
-­‐0.4464**	  
(0.1691)	   	  	  
-­‐0.0391**	  
(0.0151)	  
Observations	  
	  
55133	  
	     
 A negative binomial regression model, used to model count data, can provide an estimate 
of the impact of an individual variable on the number of occurrences of an event.  The model 
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indicates that all of the variables selected have a negative impact on the number of violations per 
inspection.  With regard to size, the model estimates that a one-unit increase in operator size 
from small to medium leads to a decrease in the log count of violations per inspection of 0.2582 
(Table 11).  This can be interpreted as the marginal effect of shifting from a small to a medium 
sized operator on average led to a decrease in the number of violations per inspection by 0.0310 
holding all else equal (Table 11).  Increasing in size from a “small” to a “medium” sized firm 
appears to lead to a significant decrease in violations per inspection (P<0.000).  This result is 
highly significant, and provides reason to believe that medium sized firms commit or are 
assessed fewer violations per inspection than small firms.  
 The results also estimate that increasing in size from a small firm to a large firm may lead 
to a decrease in the log count of violations per inspection of 0.5071 in Pennsylvania (Table 11). 
This can be interpreted as the marginal effect of shifting from a small to a large sized operator on 
average leads to a decrease in the number of violations per inspection by 0.0542 holding all else 
equal (Table 11).  This effect is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level (p<0.000) and 
indicates that there is a substantial decrease in the number of violations per inspection for large 
companies when compared to small companies.  Due to the high significance of the impact of 
size on violations, we can comfortably say that operator size has an impact on the number of 
violations per inspection.  Increases in operator size appear to lead to decreases in total 
violations.    
 The model also suggests that an operator’s international status has an impact on the 
number of violations per inspection.  The model suggests that an international company is likely 
to have fewer violations per inspection than a strictly domestic company.  The regression model 
estimates that a shift from a domestic company to an international firm, holding all else equal, 
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will lead to a decrease in the expected log count of the number of violations per inspection by 
0.3603 (Table 11).  This can be interpreted as a marginal change from a domestic to an 
international firm leads to an average decrease in the number of violations per inspection of 
0.0315 (Table 11).  This result is highly significant (p<0.000) and suggests that international 
companies are less likely to commit or be assessed violations in Pennsylvania than domestic 
firms. 
 The location of the company’s headquarters also had an impact on the number of total 
violations per inspection in PA.  The model predicts that companies whose headquarters are in 
Pennsylvania, when compared to companies whose headquarters are in other states, are likely to 
experience a decrease in the expected log count of the number of violations per inspection by 
0.4464 holding all else equal (Table 11).  This can be interpreted at the margins as a company 
that has its headquarters in CO is expected to have 0.0391 fewer violations reported per 
inspection than a company with headquarters outside of the state (Table 11). This result is also 
highly significant (p=0.009) and suggests that a company whose headquarters are inside of the 
state of PA is less likely to commit violations than a company headquartered out of state.  
 The final variable of interest in this model is the number of states an operator is active in.  
The model estimates that a one unit increase in number of states will lead to a decrease in the 
expected log count of the number of violations per inspection by 0.0101 holding all else constant 
(Table 11).  This may be interpreted at the margins as an increase in the number of states in 
operation by one state will, on average, decrease the number of violations per inspection by 
0.0009 (Table 11).  This result, while interesting, is not significant at the 5% confidence level 
(p<0.297).  For this reason, we cannot assert with confidence that the number of states an 
operator is active in has a significant impact on operator compliance in Pennsylvania.                     
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Section IV 
Discussion: 
	  
 The results of the informational interviews conducted of industry leaders and relevant 
stakeholders indicate that there may be a general assumption among members of the 
unconventional oil and gas industry regarding the link between operator size and compliance.  
Individuals surveyed believe that the industry has as assumption, albeit unsubstantiated by data, 
that larger companies are inherently less risky than smaller companies engaged in hydraulic 
fracturing.  While most respondents indicated that they believe that the industry has this 
assumption, the varied responses at the individual perspective level illustrate a current lack of 
clear and convincing data surrounding this assumption.  This paper aims to help begin to clarify 
some of the thinking surrounding this assumption and provide valuable policy information to 
regulators moving forward. 
 Those surveyed for this analysis were a small sample of individuals with experience in 
the hydraulic fracturing industry from a number of states and geographic regions including 
Pennsylvania and Colorado.  Interviewees did not indicate that there was substantial variation in 
industry assumptions by geographic or spatial region.  For this reason, there is some reason to 
believe that compliance results from Pennsylvania and Colorado fit within the alleged industry 
assumptions described by the interviewees.  
 The violation and compliance data from Colorado and Pennsylvania suggest that operator 
size has a significant impact on the expected number of violations assessed at a state regulatory 
inspection.  In Colorado, the negative binomial data from the state’s compliance dataset indicate 
that as operators increase in size, they are less likely to commit violations.  In CO, the regression 
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indicated that a shift from small firms to medium sized firms at the margins decreases the 
average expected number of violations by 0.0982 per inspection holding all else constant.  At the 
margin, larger firms are expected to on average commit 0.1334 fewer violations per inspection 
than small companies.  A similar result was seen in Pennsylvania, where an increase in operator 
size from a small firm to a medium sized firm led to a decrease in the number of violations per 
inspection at the margin by 0.0310 holding all else constant, and a decrease in violations at the 
margin by 0.0542 for large firms compared to small firms.  The results from both states were 
highly significant. 
 The difference in the magnitude and significance of results between Colorado and 
Pennsylvania may be explained by the inherent differences between the two states regulatory 
regime and differences among the operators’ active in both states.  Colorado has a longer history 
of drilling and more small operators than Pennsylvania which may relate to a lower number of 
violations per inspection for large firms.  Also, CO’s inspection regime, which is much less 
vigorous than PA’s, might have an impact on the number of violations per inspection.     
 The results from Pennsylvania are consistent with the results from other similar studies 
conducted in the area.  In a 2014 economics paper published by Jonathan Eyer, the author 
calculated the influence of the number of employees working for an operator in Pennsylvania on 
that operator’s likelihood of committing a violation during an inspection.81  Eyer uses number of 
employees as a proxy for operator size, or what he refers to as “legal liability”.  His results 
predict that an increase in legal liability corresponds with a 10% decrease in the number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Eyer J. Does Size Matter? The Effect of Firm Size on Fracking Safety. 2014. 
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violations per inspection in PA.  These results were significant at the 0.05 confidence level.82  
These results are fairly consistent with what was found in this study, albeit a lower effect level.   
 While somewhat comparable, there are substantial differences between Eyers study and 
the research conducted here.  For example, in this study, operators were lumped into three 
categorical size bins to measure size instead of using a continuous variable (number of 
employees) to represent size.  For this reason, interpretations from both papers cannot be directly 
compared; however, trends can still be interpreted.         
 The results of this study seem to confirm the industry assumptions stated by the study 
groups. However, it should not be assumed that all large operators are less risky than their 
smaller counterparts.  These results apply to the average grouping of size at the industry level 
and should be interpreted as general industry wide trends, not expectations at the individual firm 
level.   
 The informational interviews with stakeholders provide context and potential leads for 
explanations for the empirical results calculated in this study.  Multiple stakeholders suggested 
that this assumption might be in place due to fundamental differences in operational capacity 
between companies of varying size.  Larger firms are believed to have better technologies as well 
as more operational expertise than many small operators.  While most small operations are 
owned and operated by individuals who at one point in their career had been employed by large 
firms, smaller operations generally do not have the depth of experience that industry giants 
possess.83  Larger firms are also generally believed to inherently have a greater capacity to 
comply with regulations because they can afford to hire and manage entire compliance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Eyer J. Does Size Matter? The Effect of Firm Size on Fracking Safety. 2014. 
83 SMALL 2,3 ENV 1,2 Large 2,4 
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departments while smaller firms may have one of two people dedicated to ensuring company 
compliance.   
As the natural gas industry begins to understand that poor environmental operating 
practices may undermine public trust, many large companies have made strong efforts to limit 
environmental and compliance risk by implementing Environmental Management Systems 
(EMS).84  An EMS is a “framework of policy and procedures used to ensure that an organization 
can fulfill all tasks required to achieve its objectives”.85  In the environmental and compliance 
context, an EMS is a tool that provides a systematic approach for managing those components of 
an operation, function, or business that are both critical to achieve a desired level of 
environmental performance and to enhance regulatory compliance.86  Many larger firms in the 
oil and gas industry have begun to adopt this type of “plan-do-check-act” approach to managing 
environmental risks.87 The compliance departments of large companies generally operate and 
manage the EMS programs.  These departments set strict goals to prevent and limit 
environmental compliance issues.  Smaller firms often do not have the resources to create an 
effective EMS or effectively implement it into practice.  For this reason, it is possible that 
smaller companies cannot operate to the same level of compliance as larger firms, not for want 
or lack of effort, but strictly because of resource limitations. 
Along this same line of logic, larger firms may be better able to comply with state 
regulations due to their operational redundancy.  In this context, operational redundancy is the 
knowledge acquired from repeating the same procedure over and over again in the same or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14001:2004, Environmental Management Systems – 
Requirements with Guidance for Use, 2004. 
85 Id. 
86 “Prudent Development – Realizing the Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources” 
National Petroleum Council, 2011. p.230. http://npc.org/ 
87 Id. 
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similar conditions.  Large operators with many more wells in a state are more likely to have 
operational redundancy than smaller firms because they will have had more expertise in a state 
due to the sheer number of wells drilled in the area.  For example, a large company with 1,000 
wells drilled in PA will most likely be more comfortable with state regulations and know the 
local geology better than a company that has only drilled four wells in the state.  With increased 
knowledge and comfort in a particular state, one would expect a company to be less likely to 
commit violations.     
Larger firms may also be more compliant with state regulations than smaller firms due to 
concerns about their public image.  With the high level of scrutiny currently focused on the oil 
and gas industry in the United States, large operators with interests in a number of states and 
speculative plays, desperately want to preserve a positive public image.88  If an operator has 
compliance issues in one state, those problems may not only impact the operators operations in 
the state in which the violations were committed, but may also impact operations in neighboring 
states or ultimately a large firms international stock price.   
If public trust in a company or the industry as a whole deteriorates due to repeated issues 
associated with environmental and administrative compliance, the result could be that future or 
current oil and gas plays become or remain off limits for development.89  Due to the sheer scale 
of their operations, larger companies have more to lose by being dirty corporate actors.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Large 1, REG 1 
89 “Prudent Development – Realizing the Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources” 
National Petroleum Council, 2011. p.173. http://npc.org/ 
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future financial and exploratory risk incentive may push larger companies to be more compliant 
than smaller firms.90 
The interviews with stakeholders also presented information indicating that the accuracy 
and dependability of state reporting programs may be in question.  Respondents resounding told 
the interviewer that regulatory programs and inspectors are unlikely to be able to regulate all 
operational parties equally.  Most individuals indicated that no matter how well intentioned a 
regulatory regime is, there will inherently be some bias within the program.  This bias was 
generally thought of to be towards larger operators, creating scenarios in which there is 
underreporting of large operator violations.  Without independent data collection, it is impossible 
to say with certainty whether or not this true, however, if underreporting of large operators is 
rampant it would call into questions the validity of the results of this study.  
Along with this question of regulatory bias is the question of database accuracy.  Even if 
the regulatory program and its inspectors are unbiased, database management may create 
problems for anyone attempting to analyze compliance and violation data in Colorado and 
Pennsylvania.  Interviewees indicated that database completeness is an area of concern.  Multiple 
individuals suggested that there is good reason to suspect that state databases may be incomplete 
due to resource limitations in state compliance offices.91  While the data may have been 
collected, it may be the case that it was never uploaded to the reporting database.  This was not 
thought to be the result of maliciousness, but rather a result of underfunded and understaffed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 LARGE 1,2:  McCreery, J. Phillip, E. Cigala, F. 2013. Operational Excellence: The imperative for oil and gas 
companies. Bain & Company, Inc. 
http://www.bain.com/Images/BAIN_BRIEF_Operational_excellence_The%20imperative_for_oil_and_gas_compani
es.pdf 
91 REG 1, 2, ENV 2,3,4, LARGE 2,3, SMALL 2 
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state regulatory programs that are often the first agencies to lose funding during budget 
shortages.   
While there is concern about the accuracy of the available oil and gas databases, the 
majority of those interviewed still believed that valuable information could be gleaned from an 
analysis of their contents.  From these responses there appears to be a trend in thinking that 
databases are incomplete and potentially biased, however there appears to be no consensus on 
which way the supposed bias leans.  If it is the case that databases are incomplete, then this is 
another reason to look at any analysis of state oil and gas compliance data from publicly 
available sites skeptically.  However, while there may be questions surrounding the 
comprehensiveness and bias of state oil and gas reporting databases, the current state databases 
are the strongest currently available data on this subject.  
Section V    
Conclusions: 
	  
 While environmental and administrative compliance in the oil and gas industry appears to 
be improving, there are still significant areas worthy of improvement.  The results of this 
analysis suggest that larger companies are more adept to comply with state environmental and 
administrative rules and regulations than smaller companies.  This result has strong implications 
for both regulators and the industry as a whole.  From a policy perspective, this may have broad 
implications for the oil and gas industry and the states that regulate them.  If states wish to claim 
that public and environmental health are their top priorities92, then there is a strong argument to 
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be made that state regulations should be crafted with different operator risks in mind.  Due to the 
increase in violation risk associated with smaller companies, it may be reasonable to increase 
regulatory oversight or barriers to entry for smaller firms in order to minimize potential 
environmental harm and mitigate risk.   
While some regulations currently in place may act as barriers to entry, only a few 
interview respondents indicated that they have much if any effect.  These current barriers 
include, bonding requirements, high severance tax rates, and local impact fees.  Each of these 
current barriers were intended to boost state and local revenue and mitigate environmental 
damages as well as protect against catastrophic risk.   
Increasing bonding requirements would force smaller companies to hold larger sums of 
cash to protect against environmental cleanup costs.  In PA for example, the bonding 
requirement per well starts at $2,500 per well and may increase up to $10,000 based on well bore 
length.93  However, an operator’s aggregate bonding requirement may not exceed $600,000.94  
When the operating equipment to drill the well in the first place will cost a couple hundred 
thousand dollars, a bonding requirement of $2,500 is a de minimis expense for producers and 
may not be sufficient to cover environmental cleanup costs.  By increasing bonding 
requirements, it may have the result of keeping some small operators with limited cash flow out 
of the state.  By making it more difficult for small operators to access a play, states may be able 
to limit environmental impacts and increase compliance. 
The same general principle applies to severance taxes and impact fees.  Increases in both 
of these areas would have a double dividend for states.  It would increase revenues for the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93  PA Act 13 (2012) http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/act_13/20789/act_13_faq/1127392 
94 PA Act 13 (2012) http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/act_13/20789/act_13_faq/1127392 
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(severance tax) and local governments (impact fees), while decreasing compliance violations by 
keeping small companies with small profit margins out of local shale gas plays.  Increasing 
severance taxes would in effect provide more revenue to the state for each unit of oil or gas 
extracted from the ground.  Depending on the price of gas, high severance taxes may cut into the 
profits of extraction companies and would make it more difficult for firms to operate in the state 
knowing that their margins will be smaller.  Impact fees are generally local fees assessed by 
municipalities towards oil and gas operators with the intended effect of attempting to recoup 
losses from damages inflicted to the landscape due to the presence of oil and gas operations.  For 
example, fracking requires a significant amount of heavy machinery and fluids that need to be 
transported to and from the well site by large trucks.  These trucks often damage or destroy rural 
roads and stress community infrastructure.  The money collected from impact fees go towards 
mitigating these externalities.  Higher impact fees will have a similar effect as higher severance 
taxes; cutting into profits and making it more difficult for smaller operators to work in the state.       
Outside of financial requirements, states could also deal with this issue by using 
command and control regulatory practices.  By mandating Best Available Control Technology 
(BACT) at every well site instead of performance standards from the American Petroleum 
Institute (API)95, states can control the type of technology used at the well site.  This may be 
advantageous in some states considering the sheer number of wells being drilled coupled with a 
state’s lack of resources to perform adequate inspections and enforcement.  While BACT limits 
innovation, it will ensure that all companies are using the same equipment and are engaging in 
the same technical processes that have been approved by the state.  BACT may limit the effect of 
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operator size on compliance as questions over small company equipment and technology would 
be answered.   
Finally, states may look to deal with the problem of operator size influencing compliance 
by promoting incentive based regulations.  While most regulations in the oil and gas industry are 
focused on the stick, it may be beneficial for states to begin to lead operators towards compliance 
with a carrot.  By instituting clean corporate citizen or green actor provisions, states may be able 
to incentivize compliance among operators.  Clean Corporate Citizen provisions are provisions 
in which companies that have not committed a violation within a certain time window can be 
provided benefits from the regulating body.  For example, if a company in the unconventional oil 
and gas industry has not committed a violation in X number of months, then the company may 
be rewarded with an expedited permitting process which could cut down on permit approval 
times by months.96  These types of incentives would be extremely valuable to both small and 
large producers, as every day that an operator is waiting on a permit is a day in which that 
operator is not pulling oil and gas from the ground.   
While there are strong regulatory implications to this study, there are also far reaching 
industry implications as well.  Considering the high profile and public nature of the oil and gas 
industry and the difficulty of the general public to distinguish an individual operator from the 
industry as a whole, the larger oil and gas industry may be interested in industry wide 
compliance more so than individual operator compliance.  If one operator, large or small, has an 
environmental incident that catches the public’s attention, the public may be more likely to have 
a negative view of the whole industry rather than a negative view of the individual company at 
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fault.97  If this is the case, then the actions of a few small bad operators (whom appear to commit 
violations more frequently than larger companies) may be harming the larger industry.  If public 
perception of the industry swings negative, then it is possible that the entire industry will suffer 
as a result of more stringent regulations in place in reaction to public outcry.   
To mitigate this threat, large operators with a proven track record of compliance and lots 
to lose as a result of a few bad actors, may be incentivized to help smaller firms comply with 
state regulations.  Since large firms with redundant expertise have so much to lose as a result of 
more stringent regulations, or the closing of an oil or gas play, it may be in the best interest of 
large operators to share information with smaller operators in order to aid them in their 
compliance efforts.  While aiding a competitor may at first seem unwise, the long-run public 
perception of the industry and those involved in it should trump those concerns.  By helping 
smaller operators comply with environmental and administrative regulations at the well site, 
large operators may boost public perception of the industry allowing for greater industry wide 
exploration and production.     
This analysis has shown that there appears to be an assumption in the oil and gas industry 
that smaller operators are riskier than larger ones and that this assumption is backed by 
compliance and violation data from Pennsylvania and Colorado. While the effect of size on 
compliance is significant, we cannot say with absolute certainty that size contributes to operator 
violations.  However, from the data collected, there is compelling evidence to recommend that 
state regulators consider the issue of operator size when crafting new or revising old 
unconventional oil and gas regulations.  
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Appendix: 
	  
 
Appendix 1.  Example of unconventional onshore oil and gas development. Source: Chesapeake 
Energy, “Well Stimulation Technology” National Petroleum Council, “Prudent Developments” 
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Appendix 2.  Wellbore schematic. Source: “Prudent Development – Realizing the Potential of North 
America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources” National Petroleum Council, 2011. p.169. 
http://npc.org/ 
 
Appendix 3.  NA Shale Gas Basins.  Source: EIA, 2009 
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Appendix 4.  NA Tight Gas Basins.  Source: EIA, 2009 
 
 
Appendix 5.  NA Coal Bed Natural Gas Basins.  Source:  EIA, 2009 
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Appendix 6.  NA Conventional Oil and Gas Basins.  Source: EIA, 2009 
 
Appendix 7.  PA Operator size designation chart 
Operator	  
Number	  
of	  States	  
Year	  
Incorporated	  
Number	  of	  
Wells	   International	  
Public	  /	  
Private	  
Market	  
Cap	   Inspections	   Sum	   Size	  
ALPHA	  SHALE	  RES	  LP	   2.5	   0.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1	   13	   Large	  
ANADARKO	  E&P	  
ONSHORE	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   18	   Large	  
ANTERO	  RESOURCES	  
CORP	   2.5	   1	   2	   0	   2	   4	   1	   12.5	   Large	  
ATLAS	  RESOURCES	  
INC	   4	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   2.5	   1.5	   14.5	   Large	  
CABOT	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  
CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   14.5	   Large	  
CARRIZO	  
(MARCELLUS)	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   2.5	   1	   14	   Large	  
CHESAPEAKE	  
APPALACHIA	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   16	   Large	  
CHEVRON	  
APPALACHIA	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   18	   Large	  
CNX	  GAS	  CO	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   14.5	   Large	  
CONSOL	  GAS	  CO	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1	   14	   Large	  
DOMINION	  TRANS	  
INC	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   4	   0.5	   13	   Large	  
EAST	  RESOURCES	  INC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   0	   2.5	   1	   11.5	   Large	  
ENCANA	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  
USA	  INC	   2.5	   1	   1	   2	   2	   4	   0.5	   13	   Large	  
ENERGY	  CORP	  OF	  
AMER	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   1	   1	   13	   Large	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ENERPLUS	  RES	  (USA)	  
CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   2	   2	   2	   2.5	   1	   13.5	   Large	  
EOG	  RESOURCES	  INC	   4	   1	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   17.5	   Large	  
EQT	  PRODUCTION	  
CO	   4	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   16	   Large	  
EXCO	  RESOURCES	  PA	  
INC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   2.5	   1.5	   13	   Large	  
HESS	  CORP	   4	   1.5	   2	   2	   2	   4	   1	   16.5	   Large	  
HUNT	  MARCELLUS	  
OPERATING	  CO	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   2	   2	   0	   1	   1	   11.5	   Large	  
LINN	  OPR	  INC	   4	   1	   1	   0	   2	   4	   0.5	   12.5	   Large	  
MARATHON	  OIL	  CO	   4	   1.5	   1	   2	   2	   4	   0.5	   15	   Large	  
NOBLE	  ENERGY	  INC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1	   16	   Large	  
RANGE	  RESOURCES	  
APPALACHIA	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   14.5	   Large	  
RICE	  DRILLING	  B	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1	   14	   Large	  
SAMSON	  RES	  CO	   4	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   2.5	   1	   11	   Large	  
SM	  ENERGY	  CO	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   4	   1	   13.5	   Large	  
SOUTHWESTERN	  
ENERGY	  PROD	  CO	   4	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   18	   Large	  
STONE	  ENERGY	  CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   2	   0	   2	   2.5	   1	   11.5	   Large	  
SWEPI	  LP	   4	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   18	   Large	  
TALISMAN	  ENERGY	  
USA	  INC	   2.5	   1	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   16	   Large	  
ULTRA	  RESOURCES	  
INC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1	   14	   Large	  
VICTORY	  ENERGY	  
CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   4	   0.5	   11.5	   Large	  
WPX	  ENERGY	  
APPALACHIA	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   2	   4	   1.5	   14.5	   Large	  
XTO	  ENERGY	  INC	   4	   1.5	   3	   2	   2	   4	   1.5	   18	   Large	  
ALLIANCE	  
PETROLEUM	  CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   7	   Medium	  
ALTA	  OPR	  CO	  LLC	   2.5	   1	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   7.5	   Medium	  
ANSCHUTZ	  
EXPLORATION	  CORP	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   8	   Medium	  
ARRINGTON	  OIL	  &	  
GAS	  OPERATING	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   8	   Medium	  
ARUBA	  PETROLEUM	  
INC	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   2	   0	   1	   0.5	   8.5	   Medium	  
BURNETT	  OIL	  CO	  INC	   2.5	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   8	   Medium	  
CHIEF	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  LLC	   2.5	   1	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1.5	   9	   Medium	  
CITRUS	  ENERGY	  
CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   9	   Medium	  
EM	  ENERGY	  PA	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   2	   2	   1	   1	   11	   Medium	  
ENDEAVOUR	  
OPERATING	  CORP	   2.5	   1	   2	   2	   0	   1	   1	   9.5	   Medium	  
ENERVEST	  OPR	  LLC	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   8	   Medium	  
ERGON	  
EXPLORATION	  INC	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   8	   Medium	  
HALCON	  OPR	  CO	  INC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   0	   2	   1	   1	   9	   Medium	  
HILCORP	  ENERGY	  CO	   4	   1.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   10.5	   Medium	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INFLECTION	  ENERGY	  
(PA)	  	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   8	   Medium	  
J	  W	  OPERATING	  CO	   4	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   9.5	   Medium	  
NOVUS	  OPERATING	  
LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   7	   Medium	  
OPEN	  FLOW	  GAS	  
SUPPLY	  CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   2	   2	   1	   0.5	   10.5	   Medium	  
PA	  GEN	  ENERGY	  CO	  
LLC	   1	   1.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1.5	   8	   Medium	  
PDC	  MOUNTAINEER	  
LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   2.5	   0.5	   10	   Medium	  
PENN	  VIRGINIA	  OIL	  &	  
GAS	  CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   2	   0	   2	   1	   1	   10	   Medium	  
PETRO	  DEV	  CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   2.5	   0.5	   10	   Medium	  
RE	  GAS	  DEV	  LLC	   2.5	   1	   3	   0	   2	   1	   1	   10.5	   Medium	  
REX	  ENERGY	  
OPERATING	  CORP	   2.5	   1	   3	   0	   2	   1	   1	   10.5	   Medium	  
SENECA	  RESOURCES	  
CORP	   2.5	   1	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1.5	   9	   Medium	  
SNYDER	  BROS	  INC	   1	   1	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   7	   Medium	  
TENASKA	  RES	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   9	   Medium	  
TEXAS	  KEYSTONE	  INC	   2.5	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   7.5	   Medium	  
TRIANA	  ENERGY	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   8	   Medium	  
US	  ENERGY	  
EXPLORATION	  CORP	   4	   1.5	   1	   0	   2	   1	   0.5	   10	   Medium	  
VANTAGE	  ENERGY	  
APPALACHIA	  II	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   8	   Medium	  
VISTA	  OPR	  INC	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   7	   Medium	  
AB	  RESOURCES	  PA	  
LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6.5	   Small	  
AMER	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  LLC	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
APEX	  ENERGY	  (PA)	  
LLC	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
ARMSTRONG	  GAS	  CO	  
LLC	   2.5	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6	   Small	  
BAKER	  GAS	  INC	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
BELDEN	  &	  BLAKE	  
CORP	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6.5	   Small	  
BLX	  INC	   1	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
BURKLAND	  WILLIAM	  
S	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
CAMPBELL	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  
INC	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   5	   Small	  
DANNIC	  ENERGY	  
CORP	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
DE	  LTD	  FAMILY	  
PARTNERSHIP	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4.5	   Small	  
DL	  RESOURCES	  INC	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
DORSO	  LP	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
FLATIRONS	  
DEVELOPMENT	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6	   Small	  
GREAT	  OAK	  ENERGY	  
INC	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
GREAT	  PLAINS	  OPER	  
LLC	  DBA	  GREAT	  MTN	  
OPER	   2.5	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5.5	   Small	  
	  
	  
68	  
GUARDIAN	  
EXPLORATION	  LLC	   2.5	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
JR	  RESOURCES	  LP	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
LONGFELLOW	  
ENERGY	  LP	   2.5	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5.5	   Small	  
M	  &	  M	  ROYALTY	  LTD	   2.5	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6	   Small	  
MDS	  ENERGY	  DEV	  
LLC	   1	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
MID	  EAST	  OIL	  CO	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
MIEKA	  LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6	   Small	  
MTN	  V	  OIL	  &	  GAS	  
INC	   2.5	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6	   Small	  
NORTHEAST	  
NATURAL	  ENERGY	  
LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6.5	   Small	  
PATRIOT	  
EXPLORATION	  CORP	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
PENNENERGY	  
RESOURCES	  LLC	   1	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
PHILLIPS	  
EXPLORATION	  INC	   1	   0.5	   3	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
POWER	  GAS	  MKT	  &	  
TRANS	  INC	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4.5	   Small	  
REDMILL	  DRILLING	   1	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	  
SOMERSET	  REG	  
WATER	  RESOURCES	  
LLC	   1	   0.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4	   Small	  
T	  &	  F	  EXPLORATION	  
LP	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   4.5	   Small	  
TANGLEWOOD	  EXPL	  
LLC	   2.5	   0.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6.5	   Small	  
TRUE	  OIL	  LLC	   2.5	   1.5	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   6.5	   Small	  
TURM	  OIL	  INC	   1	   1.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   1	   6.5	   Small	  
WILLIAM	  MCINTIRE	  
COAL	  OIL	  &	  GAS	   1	   0.5	   2	   0	   0	   1	   0.5	   5	   Small	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Appendix 8. 
McHenry	  Master’s	  Project	  Interview	  Questions	  
	  
Interviewee:_____________________	  
Date:___________________________	  
	  
	  
- What is your relation to the oil and gas industry? 
- Would you consider yourself to be a regulator, policy advocate, representative of a 
large producer, or a representative of a small producer? 
- Could you briefly describe the parties involved in the drilling of an unconventional 
oil and gas well and their relationship? 
- Are there different classes of companies engaged in shale gas development around the 
country?  If so, what are they and how would you classify them? Are there 
differences among classes of well owners/operators? 
- How would you define large and small companies in the hydraulic fracturing 
industry? 
- Would you say that there are any generalized assumptions in the industry regarding 
differences between large and small operators? 
- Do large and small companies use the same types of drilling and safety equipment at 
the well site during exploration? Production? 
- Do small and new companies have the same level of technical expertise and 
experience as larger companies?  Does this have any influence on compliance with 
state regulations? 
- Does the industry perceive there to be any differences in regulatory compliance 
between small and large companies?  Administrative v. Environmental? 
- Have some state regulations, in those states engaged in the hydraulic fracturing 
industry, been crafted in a way that would promote the business of one type of 
company over another?  If so, what types of regulations?  
- Have some states created barriers to entry for small companies? 
- Should there be different environmental and administrative regulations for hydraulic 
fracturing companies of different sizes and experience? 
- Are state regulatory agencies capable of regulating large and small processors 
equally? 
- Do state regulators interact with small and large companies the same way?  
- How accurate are state violation reporting programs and are these programs evenly 
enforced? 
- Are there any general trends in the industry with regards to compliance and 
enforcement? 
- How do you see the unconventional oil and gas industry changing in the next five 
years?  
 
